
















ion star. We now know of many pulsars in
such binary systems, including several where
both stars are neutron stars and one system
where both are pulsars. Exquisite precision
measurements allow detection of the preces-
sion of the orbit, the inward spiraling of the
two stars, the gravitational redshift, and other
phenomena predicted by the theory of gen-
eral relativity, and confirm that theory to the
0.05% level. 
Although we understand the precision of
pulsars, we still do not understand the mecha-
nism that produces the radio emission. And
while it seems sensible that the rotation should
gradually slow (typically the period has
increased by 1 second since the extinction of
the dinosaurs), we do not really understand the
slowing-down mechanism either. Further-
more, some pulsars have “glitches”—the pul-
sar rotation speeding up suddenly—and a full
explanation of that is still pending. Precision
timing of a pulsar allows the detection of the
wobble produced by planets orbiting it, and
we know of two (or maybe three) pulsars with
planets. Two or three is a difficult number to
explain given that we know of around 2000
pulsars. You would expect none, but if we
accept that our understanding is incomplete
and that there must be a way of keeping or cre-
ating planets around pulsars, then surely there
should be many more.
Astronomers working in the high-energy
x-ray and gamma-ray wavebands have added
to the interest by finding objects that look just
like pulsars but are mostly “radio quiet.”
Pulsar magnetic fields are believed to be
large (a million million times Earth’s mag-
netic field), but some of the x-ray and gamma-
ray pulsars, known as magnetars, have fields
that are a thousand times larger still. 
And so it has gone on, amazing result
followed by jaw-dropping discovery. Al-
though the field is 40 years old, it is showing
no sign of settling down into middle age—
quite the opposite. At the moment, we seem
to be in a phase where we are discovering
“peculiar pulsars.” Unusual (or, more fairly,
unexpected) types of pulsar or neutron star
are coming to light, and we suspect we’ve
seriously underestimated the number of
neutron stars in the Galaxy. Now we have
intermittent pulsars, which are quiet more
than they pulse but still accurately maintain
the pulse phase (4, 5). We also have to revise
our understanding of the supernovae explo-
sions that create neutron stars.
Forty years is approximately a scientist’s
working lifetime, and those who joined this
new field as graduate students or postdocs
are now reaching retirement age. How-
ever, the community is young and vigorous,
with excellent leadership, so will continue to
thrive. The large radio telescopes that the
community uses were almost all in existence
when pulsars were discovered, although the
receivers and the computing facilities used
with those large telescopes have improved
immensely. But if that much can be done with
50-year old telescopes, what will the new gen-
eration of telescopes like the Square Kilo-
meter Array (6) and its precursors reveal? 
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hich would you prefer: a society of
selfish but tolerant freetraders, or
a warrior society in which people
help one another but are hostile to out-
siders? If you value both altruism and tol-
erance, neither seems ideal. Societies of
tolerant altruists, however, are exceed-
ingly rare in the simulation presented by
Choi and Bowles on page 636 of this issue
(1). Instead, altruism flourishes only in the
company of outgroup hostility (parochial-
ism), with war as both the engine of this
coevolutionary process and its legacy. For a
compatriot, the parochial altruist who risks his
life is a shining knight, whereas the outsider
encounters the sharp end of this altruism.
From an evolutionary perspective, altru-
ism—acts that benefit others at a personal
cost—is puzzling. Some influential theories
that address this puzzle are kin altruism (2),
the tendency to help blood relations; and
reciprocal altruism (3), the tendency to help
people who are likely to return the favor.
Neither explains generosity to non-kin when
costs are high and reciprocation unlikely.
Heroism in warfare is an example. Explaining
such extravagant altruism via indirect benefits
to altruists and their kin has proved difficult. A
growing body of work seeks instead to explain
altruism with models that include selection on
both individuals and groups.
In such “multilevel” models (4), the evolu-
tionary outcome depends on the relative
impact of competing pushes and pulls at indi-
vidual and group levels. Individual selection
pushes counterproductive behaviors like
altruism out of the gene pool. Group selec-
tion exerts a contrary pull, favoring groups
with many altruists over groups of more
selfish folk. In most species, individual
selection wins out. For humans living in small
groups, however, a strong group selection pull
is plausible. Evidence that intergroup violence
killed a nontrivial proportion of our ancestors
(5) has fueled interest in war as a force for
robust group selection. War is a strong candi-
date because people kill each other based on
group membership.
In Choi and Bowles’ simulation, 20 small
groups of agents interact over thousands of
generations. Agents have two genes, each with
two alleles. They are either tolerant (T) or
parochial (P) and either altruistic (A) or not
(N). Offspring inherit their parents’traits, with
occasional random mutations. Altruists help
fellow group members at a personal cost; non-
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altruists do not. Tolerant agents have lucrative
exchanges with outsiders; parochial agents do
not. A high proportion of parochials in groups
restricts trading opportunities for all. 
Among the four possible combinations of
traits, TN is the most profitable. These self-
interested traders profit both from contact
with outsiders and from the donations made
by altruists. The most costly combination is
PA. These generous warriors make donations
and also risk their lives to protect noncombat-
ants and conquer new territory for the group’s
offspring. Individual selection favors the T
and N alleles over the P and A alleles. Victory
in war favors groups with more PA types over
those with fewer. The other two trait combina-
tions are PN bullies, who are both hostile and
selfish, and TA philanthropists, who both
trade and donate to others. 
In each generation, groups are randomly
paired. What happens next depends on the
proportions of tolerant types and warriors in
the paired groups. If two highly tolerant
groups are paired, tolerant members reap the
benefits of trade. If the proportion of tolerant
types drops below a strong majority in either
group, however, the likelihood of peaceful
trade plummets. Instead, the groups have
either an unproductive standoff or a war. If
both groups have the same numbers of
warriors, a standoff results. War becomes
increasingly likely the greater the imbalance
of power, and wars end in a victory or a draw.
Some proportion of warriors are killed
regardless of outcome. In a victory, however,
many civilians on the losing side are also
killed, and offspring from a postwar baby
boom among the victors migrate into the con-
quered territory.
The societies that evolve are stable in two
conditions: when either selfish traders (TN) or
generous warriors (PA) are the dominant type.
A few PN bullies and even fewer TA philan-
thropists can coexist within trader or warrior
regimes. The trading regime is peaceful.
Standoffs and wars are more common in the
warrior regime, but even infrequent war—10
to 20% of encounters—can maintain high lev-
els of parochial altruism. Similar findings for
the impact of intermittent war on the evolution
of heroism (6) suggest that war need not be
“constant” to act as a powerful selective force. 
The convergence of altruism and paro-
chialism in Choi and Bowles’ simulation is
consistent with links between the two found in
behavioral studies. Selfish choices in social
dilemma experiments, for example, diminish
markedly when the game is embedded in an
intergroup context (7). The boost in altruism
caused by awareness of an outgroup is also
more marked among women than men (8),
consistent with war exerting stronger selective
pressure on males as warriors. Interestingly,
altruism levels for women, although relatively
unaffected by intergroup hostility, were still
high. It appears that the relative importance of
alternative evolutionary pathways to altruism
may differ for men and women.
A full accounting of such pathways must
include cultural evolution. In other work,
Bowles and colleagues show how norms can
support altruism by promoting conformity (9).
In the current simulation, warrior-rich groups
enforce a trading ban. However, this norm is
predetermined. An obvious extension would
be to allow norms to evolve. Can pro-trade
norms outcompete more isolationist parochial
norms? Do norms that punish cowards natu-
rally coevolve with war and altruism? 
The simulation findings suggest that one
legacy of war is an inherent tension between
tolerance and altruism. Cross-cultural stud-
ies, however, provide grounds for optimism.
In one study, people from 15 small-scale
societies played a donation game (10).
Average generosity correlated with the
amount of market exchange and economic
cooperation typical in the society. By adding
mutable norms to the simulation, the poten-
tial viability of societies of tolerant altruists
could be further explored. 
A better understanding of how our im-
pulses to give, to trade, and to attack outsiders
are intertwined should help in the quest to pro-
mote pro-social behavior while keeping the
sharp end of altruism sheathed. 
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ver the past 30 years, the climate
research community has made valiant
efforts to answer the “climate sensi-
tivity” question: What is the long-term equi-
librium warming response to a doubling of
atmospheric carbon dioxide? Earlier this year,
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (1) concluded that this sensitivity is
likely to be in the range of 2° to 4.5°C, with a
1-in-3 chance that it is outside that range. The
lower bound of 2°C is slightly higher than the
1.6°C proposed in the 1970s (2); progress on
the upper bound has been minimal.
On page 629 of this issue, Roe and Baker
(3) explain why. The fundamental problem is
that the properties of the climate system that
we can observe now do not distinguish
between a climate sensitivity, S, of 4°C and S
> 6°C. In a sense, this should be obvious:
Once the world has warmed by 4°C, condi-
tions will be so different from anything we
can observe today (and still more different
from the last ice age) that it is inherently hard
to say when the warming will stop. Roe and
Baker formalize the problem by showing how
a symmetric constraint on the strength of the
feedback parameter f (which determines how
much energy is radiated to space per degree
of surface warming) gives a strongly asym-
metric constraint on S. The reason is simple:
As f approaches 1, S approaches infinity. Roe
and Baker illustrate the point with the infor-
mation provided by recent analyses of
observed climate change, atmospheric feed-
backs, and “perturbed physics” experiments
in which uncertain parameters are varied in
climate models.
Knowledge of the long-term response of Earth’s climate to a doubling of atmospheric carbon 
doixide may be less useful for policy-makers than commonly assumed.
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